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Abstract
Bayesian inference as applied in a legal setting is about belief transfer and involves a
plurality of agents and communication protocols.
A forensic expert (FE) may communicate to a trier of fact (TOF) first its value of a
certain likelihood ratio with respect to FE’s belief state as represented by a probability
function on FE’s proposition space. Subsequently FE communicates its recently acquired
confirmation that a certain evidence proposition is true. Then TOF performs likelihood
ratio transfer mediated reasoning thereby revising their own belief state.
The logical principles involved in likelihood transfer mediated reasoning are discussed
in a setting where probabilistic arithmetic is done within a meadow, and with Adams
conditioning placed in a central role.
Keywords and phrases: Boolean algebra, meadow, likelihood ratio, Adams conditioning,
Bayesian conditioning, imprecise probability.
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1 Introduction
The work in this paper has been triggered by the following question stated in Lund & Iyer [29]:
why not separately communicate the two likelihoods that make up a likelihood ratio? A
proposal for an answer to this question is given in Theorem 3.4 and the subsequent comments.
The question highlights the fact that Bayesian reasoning is about communication, as well as
about probability.
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Courtroom reasoning involving Bayesian inference takes the form of a protocol by means
of which a forensic expert (FE) may interact with a trier of fact (TOF). The setup requires
that both FE and TOF maintain their own space SFE, resp. STOF of propositions, and that
both maintain a belief state that is formalized as a probability function PFE resp. PTOF on the
respective proposition spaces. It is customary to view such probabilities with the paradigm of
subjective probability.
When a single probability function is used the model supposedly involves precise beliefs.
When collections of probability functions are made use of, so-called non-singleton representors,
the model admits imprecise beliefs. Imprecise beliefs may be helpful or may even be needed
when besides uncertainty, the realm of probability functions, also ignorance is being modelled.
Modelling uncertainly with non-singleton representors is only done under the assumption that
ignorance and uncertainty are different to such an extent that ignorance cannot be adequately
represented by means of the same probability function that is used for the representation of
an agent’s uncertainty. Comments regarding imprecise beliefs in connection with Bayesian
inference are delayed until Paragraph 7.2 below.
Following a tradition initiated in forensics by Lindley (e.g. [28]) and Evett (e.g. see [19]),
who in turn based their work on the principles of subjective probability as set out by by
Ramsey, de Finetti, Carnap, and Jeffrey, a several contemporary authors shows commitment
to the exclusive usage of precise belief states: Berger & Slooten [4], Berger et. al. [3] and
Biedermann [14, 15]. Independently of forensics, theory development concerning precise beliefs
has advanced in different directions, for instance in Diaconis & Zabell [18], Bradley [16],
Gyenis [24], and Yalcin [51]. I will make use of Bradley’s presentation of Adams conditioning
in [16].
The topic of this paper is to survey how information about likelihoods and evidence that is
produced by an agent B (e.g. MOE) can be incorporated in the belief state of an agent A (e.g.
FE). The paper is primarily meant to provide a contribution to the development of probability
theory in the context of signed meadows. Initial results concerning this theme can be found in
Bergstra & Ponse [10] and Bergstra [5]. Meadows as an approach to arithmetic data types have
arisen from the equational theory of abstract data types, starting with Bergstra & Tucker [13].
Signed meadows are introduced in Bergstra, Bethke & Ponse [6]. A complete axiomatization
for the meadow of real numbers is established in Bergstra, Bethke & Ponse [7], and is applied
in the context of probabilities in Bergstra & Ponse [10].
The paper will provide several abstract versions of elementary communication protocols
between TOF and MOE such as are present in the so-called Lindley framework. Ignoring
variations on the theme I will write as if one may refer with “Lindley framework” to a definite
position which arose from the works of Ramsey, de Finetti, Carnap, Lindley, Evett, and which
is now represented by authors including Berger, Biedermann, and Taroni. In each protocol
the transfer of information about likelihoods or likelihood ratios plays a role, as well as the
processing of information thus obtained, and therefore I will speak of likelihood ratio transfer
mediated reasoning (LRTMR).1
1The central role of likelihood ratios in reporting in forensic science (which includes forensic science based
forensic practice) is strongly emphasized in the ENFSI guidelines (Willis et al. [50]).
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1.1 Trier of fact (TOF) and mediator of evidence (MOE)
In a forensic context the trier of fact (TOF) has the role of deciding about the truth of certain
statements. Below such statements are referred to as hypothesis propositions. The TOF role
may be played by a judge or by a jury. TOF may say “guilty” (or “not guilty”). The TOF may
be in need of a science backed interpretation of available evidence. Providing such information
is delegated to the forensic expert. In order to obtain a more generally applicable presentation
I will speak of a mediator of evidence (MOE) rather than of a forensic expert (FE). TOF and
MOE are the two major roles in any account of likelihood ratio transfer mediated reasoning.
1.2 Background assumptions concerning LRTMR
This paper is written on the basis of certain assumptions and guidelines which merit being
mentioned in advance.
1. The description of TOF side reasoning is done having in mind the paradigm of sub-
jective probability theory with precise probabilities for quantifying the strength of an
agent’s belief. Concerning MOE no strict commitment to subjective probability theory
is assumed.
2. We are describing abstract reasoning patterns that are based on the so-called Lindley
framework. We do not claim that there abstractions conclusive capture the logical as-
pects of the Lindley framework. This framework is biased towards providing a tool for
as well as an explanation of TOF side reasoning. Arguably different reasoning frame-
works underly the reasoning of MOE or any other relevant agents. While operating in
interaction different agents may yet entertain different conceptions of probability theory
and statistics and exchange corresponding alphanumerical data.
3. Becoming aware of the very extensive foundational literature on probability theory is a
challenge. I have no basis for the claim that the results in this paper are new except that
I did not yet find these results in this form elsewhere. More specifically I must be quite
cautious with making any claims regarding the the philosophical and methodological
adequacy, and of course the novelty and originality of the following collection of notions,
methods, and suggestions which are introduced and used in the paper, and all of which
I did not find in existing work, at least not in an explicit form.
(a) the use of single likelihood Adams conditioning as a method for TOF to process an
incoming update of a likelihood by MOE which complies with the requirements of
subjective belief theory,
(b) the use of double likelihood Adams conditioning by TOF for processing an update
of a likelihood ratio received from MOE. In Paragraph 4.7 we have some comments
on the validity of this transformation from the perspective of subjective probability
theory,
(c) the use of an auxiliary and temporary additional proposition space, in which in-
coming evidence information is processed by way of Bayesian conditioning with
proposition kinetics, thereby producing a probabilistic figure which allows sub-
sequent Jeffrey conditioning on TOF’s main proposition space, thereby avoiding
proposition kinetics on TOF’s main propositions space,
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(d) the distinction between likelihood pair and likelihood ratio, viewing a likelihood
pair as one of many possible representations of a likelihood ratio,
(e) the notions of local representation independence and global representation inde-
pendence (for methods for processing update information on likelihood ratios),
(f) the notion of single message reporting (by MOE), and the suggestion that single
message reporting is impossible for an MOE who strictly adheres to the principles
of subjective probability theory,
(g) the notion of multiple message reporting by MOE, and the suggestion that both
TOF and MOE may comply with the requirements of subjective probability theory,
both agree to separate in time the transmission from MOE to TOF of a likelihood
pair, from the subsequent transmission of an assertion.
4. The transformations of probability functions as discussed in the paper are relevant in
their own right, even if the portrayed role of these transformations in the interaction
between TOF and MOE is considered problematic,
5. A calculus or notation for belief states amounts to no more than a supportive tool
for TOF, and the calculus is merely a toolkit. Fenton, Neil & Berger[20] expect that
in actual application TOF will make use of automated support, and that the numerical
calculation of actual beliefs and of belief state revisions will not become a task for human
agents.
2 Probability calculus on the basis of involutive meadows
A meadow is a structure for numbers equipped with either a name (and one or more notations)
for the multiplicative inverse function (inversive notation) or with a name (and one or more
notations) for the division function (divisive notation). Given either name with notations the
other name and notations can be introduced as an abbreviation. For instance one may start
with x−1 as a notation for the multiplicative inverse function and write x/y as an abbreviation
for x · y−1.
From the perspective of forensic science it is wholly immaterial whether or not there is
a name in one’s language for a mathematical function, in this case division. Only when
formalizing the logic the presence or absence of names acquires relevance.
Once a name and notation (say division with notation x/y given arguments x and y)
has been introduced the question “what is x/0” may be posed and is entitled to an answer.
Assigning a value or meaning to x/0 can be done in at least 6 different ways, each of which
has been amply investigated in the mathematical and logical literature about the status the
multiplicative inverse of zero. A straightforward idea, which is adopted in this paper, is to work
under the assumption that x/0 = 0. This convention must not be portrayed as a non-trivial
insight about numbers and division, which has been overlooked by mainstream mathematics
until now, so to say. The convention to set x/0 = 0 merely represents a definite selection (out
of a number of options) on how to base one’s logic on a formalized version of arithmetic. Using
x/0 = 0 on top of the standard axioms for numbers (the axioms for a commutative ring) leads
to what is called an involutive meadow in [8].
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Developing precise logics for application in forensic science begins with the choice of a logic
for arithmetic as a step towards having a logic for the values serving as probabilities. Mathe-
matics does not provide such logics, however, the provision of which belongs to mathematical
logic. Working with an involutive meadow is just one option for choosing a logic of numbers.
My preference for working with involutive meadows derives from a preference for working with
equations and conditional equations over the explicit use of quantifiers which comes with the
use of full first order logic.2
Below decimal notation will used freely under the assumption that 2 abbreviates 1+ 1 and
so on.3
2.1 Proposition spaces and probability functions
Formulae and equations below are to be understood in the context of the specification BA+
Md+ Sign+ PFP (for: Boolean algebra + meadows + sign function + a probability function
named P ) taken from Bergstra & Ponse [10]. These equations hold for a probability function
with name P over an event space E, which takes form of a Boolean algebra of events and for
which a finite collection C of constants is available.4 As is common in the forensic literature
I will refer to events as propositions below. Formulae, however, involve sentences and syntax.
Besides a Boolean algebra of propositions there is a Boolean algebra of sentences.
Throughout the paper I will use Jeffrey’s t(•) notation for lambda abstraction with a single
variable: given a context t[−]: t(•) = λx.t[x].
2.2 Conditional probability: variations on a theme
Following [10] P 0(x | y) is defined by
P 0(x | y) =
P (x ∧ y)
P (y)
The superscript 0 indicates that P 0(x |y) = 0 whenever P (y) = 0. In [10] several other options
for defining conditional probabilities in case f P (y) = 0 is taken into account into account are
2I notice a remarkable absence of quantified formulae (in particular ∀x.Φ and ∃x.Φ for a formula Φ) in the
forensic science literature. In computer science quantifiers are used all over the place. This relative lack of
prominence of quantifiers is at first sight at odds with the frequent use of the term logic in forensics. However,
assuming that only universally quantified formulae are used, and taking into account the convention (which
prevails both in logic and in mathematics) to omit explicit mention of quantifiers while having universal
quantification as a default I entertain the view that the forensic science community implicitly shares my
preference for working with a fragment of first order logic rather over working with full first order logic. This
fragment, however, is more expressive than equational logic, which for instance does without negation. When
working in equational logic the logical operators (negation, conjunction, disjunction, material implication) are
treated as mathematical functions. The latter convention is by no means generally accepted and it comes with
its own complications.
3In Bergstra & Ponse [11] the formalization of decimal number notation by means of ground complete term
rewriting systems, a useful shape of abstract datatype specification in preparation for prototyping implemen-
tations, is studied in detail.
4For this specification a completeness theorem that was proven in Bergstra, Bethke & Ponse [7] forMd+Sign
is extended in [10]. Moreover the equational specification BA +Md + Sign + PFP is extended with so-called
conditional values, playing the role of random variables, and expectation values in Bergstra [5].
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discussed. For instance,
P 1(x | y) =
P (x ∧ y)− P (y)
P (y)
+ 1
P 1(−) satisfies: P (y) = 0 → P 1(x | y) = 1, which fits well with material implication for
two-valued logic. When dealing with Bayesian conditionalization safe conditional probability,
written as PS(x ∧ y), may be helpful:
PS(x | y) =
P (x ∧ y)− P (y) · P (x)
P (y)
+ P (x)
The advantage of safe conditional probability is that PS(• | y) = λx.PS(x | y) (using Jeffrey’s
PS(• | y) notation as a “dedicated” form of lambda abstraction, as was stated above) is a
probability function for all y, which is not the case for P 0(•|y) and for P 1(•|y). Denoting with
↑ the “undefined” outcome of a function, the conventional notion of a conditional probability
due to Kolmogorov reads as follows:
P ↑(x | y) =
P (x ∧ y)
P (y)
⊳ P (y)⊲ ↑ .
Here a⊳ b⊲c stands for if b 6= 0 then a else c. The conditional operator allows a straightforward
definition in an involutive meadow:5
x⊳ y ⊲ z =
y
y
· x+ (1−
y
y
) · z
Notwithstanding the fact that P ↑(−) corresponds best with what ordinary school mathematics
has to say about division, properly formulating its logic is far more involved than developing
the logic needed to work with P 0(−|−) or with P 1(−|−) or PS(−|−).6 Using the conditional
operator the definitions of P 1(−|−) and PS(−|−) can be made more illuminating:
P 1(x | y) =
P (x ∧ y)
P (y)
⊳ P (y)⊲ 1 and PS(x | y) =
P (x ∧ y)
P (y)
⊳ P (y)⊲ P (x).
The literature on conditional probabilities taking probability zero for the condition into
account is quite complex. Popper functions, nonstandard probabilities, Renyi’s conditional
probability, and De Finetti’s coherent conditional probability come into play. Working with
P 0(−) excludes some of these options for dealing with conditional probability functions, but
choosing to work with an involutive meadow does not by itself introduce such kind of bias. On
the contrary, working in an involutive meadow allows to proceed with the formalization of each
of the mentioned options (and more) for the definitions of conditional probability functions.
2.3 Relevance of meadows for the work in this paper
The potential advantages of the use of meadows as the domain of values for a probability
function in the context of probabilistic reasoning are surveyed in the following items.
5In the presence of ↑ weaker equations are needed: such as x⊳ 0⊲ z = z, x⊳ 1 ⊲ z = x, x⊳ ↑ ⊲z =↑, and
x⊳ y ⊲ z = x⊳ y
y
⊲ z.
6The choice made below for using P 0(−|−) rather than P 1(−|−) or PS(−|−) is merely a matter of taste.
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1. All relevant equations and conditional equations can be written such as to be valid in a
two valued classical logic as understood for all substitutions of values for variables.7
2. Proofs of equations and of conditional equations can be given relative to the equational
proof system BA +Md + Sign + PFP , often used in combination with some additional
operator definitions. No separate import of a theory of real numbers or of set theory is
required.
3. The following semantic problem that permeates conventional school mathematics is
avoided. It is not uncommon to insists that in the world of rational numbers the following
assertion Φ(x) holds in general. Φ(x) asserts
x 6= 0→ x/x = 1
In other words ∀x.Φ(x) is considered a valid assertion. The idea is that difficulties
regarding division by zero are excluded by the condition. Many presentations of Bayes’
theorem implicitly presuppose this assumption. However, classical logic does not work
that way. For the condition to play a role, it is plausible that 0 can be substituted for
x. And in order for ∀x.Φ(x) to be true it is required that Φ(0) is true, just as all other
substitution instances Φ(q) substituting a rational number q for x must hold. Truth of
∀x.Φ(x) implies the turth of:
0 6= 0→ 0/0 = 1
In classical logic the validity of the proposition 0 6= 0→ 0/0 = 1 results from a bottom
up definition of truth. Assuming a classical two-valued logic 0/0 = 1 must be either
true or false. But conventional mathematics is reluctant to commit to either option.
It appears that when dealing with fractions conventional mathematics deviates from
classical first order logic.
4. Three-valued logics provide a solution to the the dilemma mentioned in item 3, but the
corresponding proof systems become harder to grasp than probability theory proper.
Close to conventional mathematical intuition is to work with partial functions and to
formalize arithmetic using a logic of partial functions. Designing logics of partial func-
tions can be done in many ways, however, while providing no obvious preferred options.
5. An alternative perspective on this matter is to maintain a temporal interpretation of
implication, thereby turning propositional calculus into a so-called short circuit logic.
The idea is that if a condition φ of an implication φ → ψ fails the conclusion ψ is left
unevaluated and even its syntax or its well-definedness need not be checked. Short-
circuit logics have been worked out in ample detail in Bergstra, Ponse & Staudt [12].
These details, however, are prohibitively complex for application in probability theory.
6. When taking numbers from a meadow the use of a conditional probability P (x∧y)/P (y)
is always permitted and does not have the side effect of introducing or implicitly pre-
supposing the assumption that P (y) is non-zero.
7No attempt is made in the paper to work out these matters in full detail. In many cases instead of an
assumption that say t 6= 0, for a closed term t, it is assumed or derived that t/t = 1, which given the theory
of meadows amounts to the same. The claimed advantage is that working with meadows allows to achieve
100% semantical precision in these matters in principle. Compared with a conventional style of mathematical
writing working with meadows does not imply or induce any additional commitment to a formalistic and
possibly overly detailed approach.
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An example may clarify the relevance of fact. In colloquial language and within informal
mathematics an agent A may ask an agent B for B’s guess of the conditional probability
that some agent C has sold a particular object F under the condition that C has stolen
that same object.
Now, when working in a conventional and informal style, by merely speaking of this
conditional probability, A already implicitly states (requires, assumes) that the proba-
bility that C has stolen the object F is non-zero. Having a meadow in mind A is not
committed to such an assumption.
7. The assertion that PA(H) 6= 0 may be expressed as PA(H)/PA(H) = 1. However,
there is still a problem with this assertion because the constraint PA(H)/P −A(H) = 1
cannot be conveniently expressed in the language of probability functions with precise
beliefs. From the perspective of subjective probability with beliefs represented by precise
probability functions the assertion that PA(C-has-stolen-F) > 0 is informative about
A’s belief, while at the same time it is uninformative as an exclamation by A about their
own state of belief. Indeed, at any time A should be able, by definition of the concept of
subjective probability, to encode their level of uncertainty concerning “C has stolen F”
in a probability function with precise values, e.g. by stating that PA(C-has-stolen-F) =
0 or by stating that PA(C-has-stolen-F) = 10
−10. But questions remain: can it
be the case that for some rational r, A’s belief is PA(C-has-stolen-F) = r, while
representing r precisely as a fraction is unfeasible for A because it requires an extremely
long expression? If so, can it be the case that A cannot do better than to communicate
an interval PA(C-has-stolen-F) > a with rational a chosen in such a way that denoting
it is feasible?
2.4 Additional equations and conditional equations
The completeness result of Bergstra & Ponse [10] allows to use all conditional equations which
are true in the meadow of real numbers. These are derivable from the finite equational theory
BA+Md+ Sign+ PFP . For instance
Θ(X)
Θ(X)
= 1→
1 + Θ(X)
1 + Θ(X)
= 1
may be assumed for expressions Θ(X) of the following form
P (Ψ), (P (Ψ))−1, P (Ψ1) · P (Ψ2), L
0(Ψ1,Ψ2), LR
0(Ψ1,Ψ2,¬Ψ2)
(with Ψ,Ψ1,Ψ2 expression for a proposition) and for other expressions which cannot take a
negative value.
It should be noted that although BA+Md+Sign+PFP is sound and complete for the case
of real number valued probability functions, the same axiom system is merely sound but not
complete for rational number valued probability functions. For instance (x2− 1) · (x2− 1) = 1
is true in the meadow of rationals but is not derivable from BA+Md+ Sign+ PFP .
The question whether or not a finite and complete equational axiomatisation of the equa-
tional theory of the meadow of rational numbers exists (as mentioned e.g. in [7]) is still open
and so is the corresponding question for signed meadows in the presence of probability func-
tion.It is also open whether or not a computably enumerable complete axiomatisation of the
equational theory of the meadow of rational numbers exists.
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2.5 Transformations of proposition spaces and belief functions
The work in this paper is sensitive to the precise shape of proposition spaces and probability
functions on proposition spaces. Rather than working out these matters by way of preparation
to the sequel of the paper, in full detail, I will limit this presentation to the mentioning of
scattered aspects, while giving definitions by way of representative examples rather than in a
more general notational form.
The proposition space of an agent, say A, will be denoted with SA. If it is known that
the proposition space is generated by primitive propositions, say H,L,M,N , I will write
SA = SA(H,L,M,N), if there are only two generators one has e.g. SA(L,M) or SA(H,L).
A belief function PA (supposedly encoding beliefs of agent A at some moment of time) maps
each proposition in a proposition space to a value in a number space, for which the meadow
of rational numbers will be chosen below. More sophisticated work may call for the meadow
of reals.
A belief function is best thought of as a pair (SA, PA), though the domain SA will often
be left implicit. Transformations of such pairs are core of Bayesian inference. The following
transformations on belief functions will play a role in this paper.
Bayes conditioning (without proposition kinetics). Let for example SA = SA(L,M,N).
Suppose PA(M) = p with p > 0. Then P̂A is obtained by Bayes conditioning if it satisfies
the following equation:
P̂A = P
0
A(• |M)
This abbreviates that for all X ∈ SA, P̂A(X = P 0A(X) |M). It follows that P̂A(M) = 1
and the proposition space is left unaffected.8
Bayes conditioning with proposition kinetics. Let once more SA = SA(L,M,N). Sup-
pose PA(M) = p with p > 0. Then (SA(L,N), P̂A) is obtained by Bayes conditioning if
P̂A satisfies the following equation:
P̂A = P
0
A(• |M)
Bayes conditioning with proposition kinetics removes M from SA with the effect that
after Bayes conditioning with respect to M the proposition space has been reduced to
SA = SA(L,N).
Bayes conditioning on a non-primitive proposition. Let, again by way of example, the
proposition space of A have three generators: SA = SA(L,M,N). Suppose Φ is a closed
propositional sentence making use of primitives L,N, and M . Suppose PA(Φ) = p with
p > 0. Then P̂A is obtained by Bayes conditioning on Φ if it satisfies the following
equation:
P̂A = P
0
A(• | Φ)
When conditioning on a non-primitive proposition kinetics does not apply, i.e. the propo-
sition space is left as it was.
8Bayes conditioning comes under alternative names: Bayes conditioning, Bayes’ conditioning, Bayes condi-
tionalization, Bayes’ conditionalization, Bayesian conditioning, Bayesian conditionalization. In this paper only
Bayes conditioning and Bayesian conditioning is used.
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Jeffrey conditioning. Let for example SA = SA(L,M,N). Suppose PA(M) > 0. Then P̂A
is obtained by Jeffrey conditioning if for some p ∈ [0, 1] it satisfies the following equation:
P̂A = p · P
0
A(• |M) + (1− p) · P
0
A(• | ¬M)
Jefrey conditioning involves no proposition kinetics. Bayesian conditioning without
proposition kinetics may be understood as the version of Jeffrey conditioning with p = 1.9
Proposition space reduction. Consider SA = SA(L,M,N), one may wish to forget about
sayM . Proposition kinetics now leads to a reduced proposition space SA(L,N) in which
only the propositions generated by L and N are left.
Proposition space reduction constitutes the simplest form of proposition kinetics.
Parametrized proposition space expansion. Let SA = SA(H). One may wish to expand
SA to a proposition space by introducing M to it in such a manner that a subsequent
reduct brings one back in SA.
PA(H) is left unchanged but PA(H ∧M) and PA(H ∧M) must be fixed with definite
values. A specification of the new probability function, say QA (with domain S(H,M) is:
QA(H) = PA(H), QA(H ∧M) = q1, QA(¬H ∧M) = q2 with q1 and q2 appropriate ratio-
nal number expressions. If one intends to extend SA = SA(L,M) to SA = SA(L,M,N)
four additional values for the probability functions are needed and so on.
Symmetric proposition space expansion. Let SA = SA(N,H). One may wish to expand
SA to a proposition space by introducing M to it in such a manner that a subsequent
reduct brings one back in SA but one may not wish to guess any parameters. Now it
suffices to assert that for each closed propositional expression Φ over the propositional
primitives N and H . QA(M ∧ Φ) = QA(M ∧ ¬Φ), in other words all parameters are
chosen with value 12 .
Base rate inclusion. This is a special case of parametrized proposition space expansion,
and a generalization of symmetric proposition space expansion. Let p be a closed value
expression with p > 0, and assume that BRh is a new proposition name. BRh is
introduced in order to include the base rate p (for some relevant type of event, named
h) in the probability function.
The probability function is extended as follows: QA(BRh ∧ Φ) = p · QA(Φ), for all
sentences Φ not involving BRh.
Single likelihood Adams conditioning. Let 0 < l ≤ 1 be a rational number, (given by a
closed expression for it). Assume that H and E are among the generators of SA. Single
likelihood Adams conditioning leaves the proposition space unchanged and transforms
the probability function PA to Ql (leaving out the subscript A for ease of notation).
Ql = PA(H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
l
P 0A(E |H)
+ PA(H ∧ ¬E ∧ •) ·
1− l
P 0A(¬E |H)
+ PA(¬H ∧ •)
Double likelihood Adams conditioning. Let 0 < l, l′ ≤ 1 be two rational numbers, (each
given by a closed meadow expressions). Assume that H and E are among the generators
9Jeffrey conditioning has finite as well as infinitary versions. According to Diaconis & Zabell [18] only its
infinitary versions are stronger than any Bayesian rules.
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of SA. Double likelihood Adams conditioning leaves the proposition space unchanged
and transforms the probability function PA to Ql,l′ .
Ql,l′ = PA(H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
l
P 0A(E |H)
+ PA(H ∧ ¬E ∧ •) ·
1− l
P 0A(¬E |H)
+
PA(¬H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
l′
P 0A(E | ¬H)
+ PA(¬H ∧ ¬E ∧ •) ·
1− l′
P 0A(¬E | ¬H)
2.6 A labeled transition system of credal states
A pair (SA, PA) may be understood as the logical counterpart of an agent A’s state of beliefs.
As A may have beliefs not captured as assertions in SA, (SA, PA) is often referred to as A’s
partial beliefs or as A’s partial state of beliefs.
In other words (SA, PA) contains (as elements of SA) and quantifies (via PA) only some of
the agent’s beliefs. During a reasoning process (SA, QA) plays the role of a credal state in a
model of the kinetics (dynamics) of A’s credences. Two credal states (SA, PA) and (SA, QA)
are called compatible if the same propositions (or rather sentences) of SA have probability 0
(and thus 1) under PA as under QA.
Now the collection CSU is defined as consisting of all credal states with a Boolean algebra
that is generated by a finite subset W of a countable set U of propositional atoms, and with
a probability function taking values in the meadow of rational numbers..
Each of the transformations as outlined above in Paragraph 2.5 may be viewed as a (condi-
tional) rule which generates transitions between credal states. Transitions are labeled by the
rule involved plus the parameters that are used for a specific transition.
Labels are derived from rules, and the label created from a rule contains information about
the name of the transformation and possibly of parameters, while the transition itself is be-
tween the prior and posterior state of the transformation. We will use the following labels
(with M ∈ U and p a rational number in [0, 1]):
• Bayes conditioning without proposition kinetics has a single parameter, and a single
condition. The label is [bc;E] and the condition is PA(E) > 0]. The transition according
to this rule requires of the prior credal state (SA(W ), PA) (withW ⊆ U), that E ∈ W and
that PA(E) = p. So if PA(E) > 0 there is a transition (SA(W ), PA) → (SA(W ), P 0A(• |
E)) with label [bc;E].
• Bayes conditioning with proposition kinetics generates transitions with label [bcpk;E]
under the condition PA(E) > 0].
• Bayes conditioning on a nonprimitive proposition has label [bcnp;H ] and condition
PA(H) > 0].
• Jeffrey conditioning has label [jc;M ].
• Proposition space reduction has label [psr,M ].
• Parametrized proposition space expansion has label [ppse;M,N1, . . . , Nn, p1, . . . , p2n ].
Here N1, . . . , Nn is an enumeration without repetition of elements of U serving as gener-
ators for the proposition space at hand, and p1, . . . , p2n enumerates, in a predetermined
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order, the new probabilities P̂A(M ∧ φ) for φ an expression in conjunctive normal form
over the mentioned generators.
• Symmetric proposition space expansion has label [sppse;M ]. This is just parameterized
proposition space expansion with all pi equal to 1/2.
• Base rate inclusion has label [bri;M ; p]. This rule generalises symmetric proposition
space expansion and specializes parametrised proposition space expansion.
• Single likelihood Adams conditioning has label [slac;E,H ; l], with l a rational number
in (0, 1].
• Double likelihood Adams conditioning has label [dlac;E,H ; l, l′], with l, l′ rational num-
bers in (0, 1].
CSA(U) denotes the collection of finite credal states for agent A with a proposition space
generated by elements of U . CSltsA (U) is CSA(U) equipped with the structure of a labeled
transition system, using the labeling mentioned above. This definition is limited by the re-
quirement that quantities are rational. These definitions have obvious counterparts in case
real numbers are used.
It follows from an observation in Diaconis & Zabell[18] that if Ψ = (SA, PA) and Ψ
′(SA, QA)
are compatible credal states it is possible to make a path of transitions CSltsA (U) in from Ψ
to Ψ′ in two steps, a parameterized proposition space expansion step followed by a Bayesian
conditioning step.
3 Belief kinetics and likelihood ratio transfer
Likelihood ratio transfer mediated reasoning (LRTMR) refers to a spectrum of reasoning
patterns used at the receiving side of probabilistic information.10 I will use LRTMR as a
container for abstract formalizations of various patterns of Bayesian reasoning.
In order to emphasize the general nature of the protocols and methods for LRTMR, and in
order to simplify the presentation of expressions and proofs, I will use A instead of TOF and
B instead of MOE.
In this Section it is assumed that the proposition space of A is left unchanged during the
reasoning process. In other words, there is only belief kinetics but no proposition kinetics.11
The outline of LRTMR in Paragraph 3.2 below will serve as a point of departure for some
more technical work.
3.1 Evidence transfer mediated reasoning and the Taxi Color Case
The simplest Bayesian reasoning pattern involving A’s reaction to and way of processing of
information obtained from B occurs if A maintains a proposition space SA(E,H) and a belief
10Logical aspects of courtroom proceedings worth of formal scrutiny and involving probabilistic information
arise in various contexts. For instance the implicit proof rule for the probability of a conjunction as listed in
Arguello [1] seems to be wrong and the reasoning pattern discussed by Stephens in [39] lies outside the patterns
considered below.
11In the literature on subjective probability theory instead of belief kinetics the phrase belief dynamics is
used as an alternative, and instead of proposition kinetics the phrase proposition dynamics occurs.
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function PA defined on it for which PA(E) = p > 0. In these circumstances it may happen
that B sends to A a message to the extent that according to B the proposition E is valid, or
in other words that PB(E) = 1. A trusts B and intends to adopt B’s belief that E is true. A
can do so by updating its belief function. Thus A reacts to the input from B by performing
Bayesian conditioning on E, thereby revising its belief function to P̂A = P
0(• | E).
An example of this reasoning pattern occurs in the so-called Taxi Color Case as specified in
detail in Schweizer [36].12 In a town (here TCCC, Taxi Color Case City), in total 1000 taxis
circulate, 150 of which are green and 850 of which are blue. A witness W stated that (s)he
saw a defendant D leave with a green taxi from a specific location, more specifically W saw
D departing with the first taxi in the taxi queue in front of restaurant R at 23.00 PM.
Simplifying the case in comparison to Schweizer’s description it is assumed that A main-
tains an estimated base rate of 80% for the correctness of W ’s testimony. According to A’s
background knowledge it may be expected in general for a witness operating in the condi-
tions of W at the time of the reported event that the witness (not just the actual witness W
but rather some average of test candidates) will report the color of the taxi correctly with a
probability of 80%.13
A is supposed to work with a proposition space with two propositions: H (the hypothesis
proposition asserting that D left with a green taxi from the mentioned place and at the
mentioned time), and E (the evidence proposition asserting that according to W ’s testimony
D left with a green taxi). A uses, lacking other data, the base rate on operational taxi’s
(irrespective of location and time) of 150/1000 to set PA(H) = 150/1000, and A uses the base
rate of 80% valid reporting (for both colors) to set: P 0A(E |H) = 80% and P
0
A(¬E |¬H) = 80%
whence PA(E |¬H) = 100%−80% = 20%, so that PA(E ∧H) = P 0A(E |H) ·PA(H) = 80/100 ·
150/1000 = 12/100 and PA(E∧¬H) = P 0A(E |¬H)·PA(¬H) = 20/100 ·850/1000 = 17/100. It
follows that PA(E) = PA(E∧H)+PA(E∧¬H) = 12/100+17/100 = 29/100. (SA(E,H), PA)
serves as a prior belief state (credal state) for A.
Now one assumes that A obtains evidence from B in the form of B’s assertion (PB(E) = 1)
thatW made a testimony which may be faithfully rendered at the relevant level of abstraction
as amounting to E, so that A may now assume that E is true. A intends to adopt (PA(E) = 1)
in its belief state, which must therefore be modified to, say P̂A = P̂A(•) (the function which
assigns P̂A(X) to proposition X). Given the acquired additional information A may revise the
quantitative consequences of its prior adoption of base rates, by applying Bayesian conditioning
(without proposition kinetics) relative to E. As P 0A(E) > 0 a transition with label [bc;E] can
take place from (SA(E,H), PA) to (SA(E,H), P̂A) with P̂A = P
0(• | E) (the probability
function which assigns probability P 0(• |E) to proposition X). Now A may calculate (rather
than than guess by introspection) its new belief in H :
P̂A(H) = P
0
A(H | E) =
P 0A(E |H) · PA(H)
PA(E)
=
80/100 · 150/100
29/100
=
12/100
29/100
= 12/29
12Schweizer [36] contains a detailed description of the taxi color case, together with a useful survey of
precise terminology in German about forensic reasoning patterns involving likelihood transfer and Bayesian
conditioning. I will decorate the the case description with some additional details. In Schweizer [37] the similar
bus color scenario is mentioned in an exposition concerning the legal value of base rates.
13In Schweizer’s description, in contrast, B investigates the statement of the witness, including an investi-
gation concerning W ’s ability to correctly report about the color of a taxi including for instance (my details)
information regarding the position from where she claimed to have been standing at the alleged time of D’s
departure by taxi, and taking into account the overall illumination of the scene.
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The new belief of A in H significantly exceeds the base rate of 150/1000 which was A’s prior
belief in H . A becoming aware of its new belief in H concludes its episode of Bayesian
reasoning as exemplified in this case.
The role of likelihoods and likelihood ratio. The example, as presented here and in
contrast with Schweizer’s presentation, makes no use of the transfer of a single likelihood or
of a pair or a quotient of likelihoods by B. However, A encounters two likelihoods
l = P 0A(E |H) = 80/100 and l
′ = P 0A(E | ¬H) = 20/100 = 1/5
and, implicitly the likelihood ratio r = l/l′ = 4.
The likelihoods l and l′ provide A with information about the expected reliability of a
witness in the case at hand. It is plausible that B has obtained a value for l and l′ from
elsewhere. Remarkably, as it turns out r provides about the as much useful information for A
as the likelihood pair (l, l′)
An example of likelihood ratio transfer. A may take r = P 0A(E |H)/P
0
A(E | ¬H) for a
definition of r and may investigate what value to assign to r only after becoming involved in
the case at hand. For instance A may ask B to investigate this figure and to report about it.
Such an investigation may range from measuring a base rate by averaging the performance
of a sample consisting of several agents not themselves involved in the case, to a laboratory
based examination of the relevant performance of the actual witness W . In the taxi color
case, B may report to A that P 0B(E |H) = 90% and P
0
A(E | ¬H) = 10%, i.e. a likelihood ratio
of 9. Then A can adopt this information from B, and adapt its probability distribution to
accommodate these figures and thereafter incorporate the information that PB(E) = 1 with
the result that (e.g. using Theorem 3.3.1 (5) below) a higher value for P̂A(H) is obtained:
P̂A(H) =
9 · PA(H)
1 + (9− 1) · PA(H)
=
9 · 15/100
1 + (9− 1) · 15/100
= 135/220 = 27/45 > 12/29
In subsequent paragraphs a variety of interactions between A and B is considered where,
in advance of providing evidence information regarding E, B determines a likelihood pair
P 0B(E | H) and P
0
B(E | ¬H) and subsequently conveys these either in separate steps, or in a
single step as a pair or in a single step while merely transferring the ratio of both, in each
case with the intent of overruling the respective likelihoods or the likelihood ration which are
given by A’s prior belief function.
Further remarks on TCC The term “likelihood” is merely another word for conditional
probability used in specific circumstances. In the example A plays the role of TOF and B plays
the role of MOE. The event of a single taxi departure in TCCC provides a remarkably nice
case study for theoretical work as it allows an amazing range of further details and significant
complications, to mention:
(i) different methods for determining witness reliability, the presence of multiple witnesses,
witnesses with different reliability and with conflicting assertions, (ii) taking other colours, car
model information, or number plate information into account, (iii) taking taxi management,
scheduling, and monitoring into account, and (iv) using improved base rate estimations.
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3.2 Outline of the LRTMR reasoning pattern
Often the term likelihood is used to denote a certain conditional probability. We write L0α for
a likelihood and LR0α for a particular ratio of likelihoods, commonly referred to as a likelihood
ratio.
L0α(X,Y ) = P
0
α(X | Y ) and LR
0
α(X,Y,¬Y ) =
L0α(X,Y )
L0α(X,¬Y )
It is now assumed that both E and H are among the generators of both proposition spaces
SA and SB. Further A and B have prior credal states (SA, PA) and (SB, PB). The reasoning
protocol LRTMR involves the following steps:
1. It is checked by B that 0 < PB(H) < 1 and 0 < PB(E) < 1, otherwise B raises an
exception and the protocol aborts.
2. B determines the value r of the likelihood ratio LR0B(E,H,¬H) =
L0B(E,H)
L0B(E,¬H)
=
P 0B(E |H)
P 0B(E | ¬H)
with respect to its probability function PB.
3. If LB(E,¬H) = 0 B raises an exception and the protocol aborts.
4. B communicates to A the value r and a description of LR0B(E,H,¬H), that is a de-
scription of what propositions r is an LR of.
5. B communicates its newly acquired information to A that it now considers PB(E) = 1,
i.e. E being true, to be an adequate representation of the state of affairs.
6. A trusts B to the extent that A prefers those of B’s quantitative values that B com-
municates during a run of the protocol over its own values for the same probabilities,
likelihoods, and likelihood ratios.
7. A takes all information into account and applies Bayesian conditioning to end up with
its posterior belief function P̂A which satisfies:
P̂A(H) =
r · PA(H)
1 + (r − 1) · PA(H)
(1)
A becoming aware of it having updated its beliefs in accordance with the “Bayesian” paradigm
concludes the protocol.14
The equation that specifies the posterior belief on H is equivalent in probability calculus
to the more familiar odds form of Bayes’ Theorem:
P̂A(H)
P̂A(¬H)
= r ·
PA(H)
PA(¬H)
The proof consists of a trivial computation when using equations and conditional equations
such as discussed in Paragraph 2.4.
14The protocol is normative to the extent that A is supposed to follow the calculation of P̂A(H) rather than
some subjective guess on how to update its beliefs. Thus, on the one hand A is required to start out with a
subjectively determined prior credal state, but A is not entitled to enact updates subjectively, quite on the
contrary, A’s updating conventions are prescribed by the protocol.
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The description of LRTMR is a drastic abstraction used for the purposes of the paper and
diverse aspects are left unspecified including: (i) has an invitation to B occurred for it to play
a role in the protocol, (ii) how is an abort of the revision process performed when necessary,
(iii) are any assumptions about the absence of background knowledge required for either
A or for B, (iv) making sure that checking various conditions does not involve information
transfer between A and B which stands in the way of the properly performing the conditioning
operations?
3.3 Belief kinetics I: single likelihood Adams conditioning and rep-
resentation independence
I will first consider an adaptation of the protocol named SLTMR for successive (or separate)
likelihood transfer mediated reasoning. SLTMR results from LRTMR by modifying step 4 as
follows:
First B determines l and l′ such that l = L0B(E,H), l
′ = L0B(E,¬H), and r = l/l
′.15 Then
B successively communicates first l and then l′ to A, in both cases in addition to information
concerning what sentences these values are likelihoods of.
In order to process the incoming information concerning l and l′, A first applies the following
transformation, thereby obtaining an intermediate (precise) belief function Ql:
Ql = PA(H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
l
P 0A(E |H)
+ PA(H ∧ ¬E ∧ •) ·
1− l
P 0A(¬E |H)
+ PA(¬H ∧ •) (2)
Following the exposition of Bradley [16] this is the Adams transformation corresponding to
an intended update of likelihood L0A(E,H) to value l.
Next A applies Adams conditioning to P ′ in order to update its likelihood LA(E,¬H) to
value l′, thus obtaining a second intermediate belief function Rl.l′ :
Rl,l′ = Ql(¬H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
l′
Q0l (E | ¬H)
+Ql(¬H ∧ ¬E ∧ •) ·
1− l′
Q0l (¬E | ¬H)
+Ql(H ∧ •) (3)
Finally A applies Bayesian conditioning to Rl.l′ with respect to E, thereby obtaining its
posterior beliefs P̂A:
P̂A = R̂l,l′ = R
0
l.l′(• |E) (4)
The following facts can be shown concerning this sequence of three conditioning steps:
Theorem 3.3.1. Given the assumptions and definitions mentioned above, in particular as-
suming l/l = l′/l′ = PA(H)/PA(H) = PA(E)/PA(E) = PA(E ∧H)/PA(E ∧H) =
PA(E ∧ ¬H)/PA(E ∧ ¬H) = PA(¬E ∧H)/PA(¬E ∧H) = PA(¬E ∧ ¬H)/PA(E ∧ ¬H) = 1,
the following identities are true for l, l′, r, PA, Ql, Rl,l′ , and R̂l,l′ :
1. Q0l (E |H) = l
15It is assumed that l and l′ are known as closed expressions with non-zero and non-negative value not in
excess of 1 for the meadow of rational numbers. This assumption is implicitly used many times below in order
to be able to apply t/t = 1 for various terms t. The same use is made of non-zero prior odds PA(H) and
PA(E) which must as well be known in terms of such expression so as to guarantee PA(H)/PA(H) = 1 and
PA(E)/PA(E) = 1.
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2. R0l,l′(E |H) = l
3. R0l,l′(E | ¬H) = l
′
4.
R 0l,l′(E |H)
R 0l,l′(E | ¬H)
= r
5. R̂l,l′(H) =
r · PA(H)
1 + (r − 1) · PA(H)
6. Rl,l′(X) = PA(¬H ∧ E ∧X) ·
l′
P 0A(E | ¬H)
+ PA(¬H ∧ ¬E ∧X) ·
1− l′
P 0A(¬E | ¬H)
+
PA(H ∧ E ∧X) ·
l
P 0A(E |H)
+ PA(H ∧ ¬E ∧X) ·
1− l
P 0A(¬E |H)
Proof. The proof of Theorem 3.3.1 is a matter of calculation on the basis of the available
equational axioms and definitions.
1. (a) Ql(H)
= (PA(H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
l
P 0A(E |H)
+ PA(H ∧ ¬E ∧ •) ·
1− l
P 0A(¬E |H)
+ PA(¬H ∧ •))(H)
= PA(H ∧ E) ·
l
P 0A(E |H)
+ PA(H ∧ ¬E) ·
1− l
P 0A(¬E |H)
+ PA(¬H ∧H)
= PA(H ∧ E) ·
l · PA(H)
PA(E ∧H)
+ PA(H ∧ ¬E) ·
(1− l) · PA(H)
PA(¬E ∧H)
= l · PA(H) + (1 − l) · PA(H)
= PA(H)
(b) Ql(E ∧H)
= (PA(H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
l
P 0A(E |H)
+ PA(H ∧ ¬E ∧ •) ·
1− l
P 0A(¬E |H)
+ PA(¬H ∧ •))(H ∧ E)
= PA(H ∧ E ∧H ∧ E) ·
l
P 0A(E |H)
+ PA(H ∧ ¬E ∧H ∧ E) ·
1− l
P 0A(¬E |H)
+
PA(¬H ∧H ∧ E)
= PA(H ∧ E) ·
l
P 0A(E |H)
= l · PA(H)
(c) Q0l (E |H) =
Ql(E ∧H)
Ql(H)
=
l · PA(H)
PA(H)
= l
2. R0l,l′(E |H) =
Rl,l′(E ∧H)
Rl,l′(H)
=
Ql(H ∧E ∧H)
Ql(H ∧H)
=
Ql(E ∧H)
Ql(H)
= Q0(E |H) = l
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3. (a) Rl,l′(¬H)
= (Ql(¬H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
l′
Q0l (E | ¬H)
+Ql(¬H ∧ ¬E ∧ •) ·
1− l′
Q0l (¬E | ¬H)
+Ql(H ∧ •))(¬H)
= Ql(¬H ∧ E ∧ ¬H) ·
l′
Q0l (E | ¬H)
+Ql(¬H ∧ ¬E ∧ ¬H) ·
1− l′
Q0l (¬E | ¬H)
+Ql(H ∧ ¬H)
= Ql(E ∧ ¬H) ·
l′
Q0l (E | ¬H)
+Ql(¬E ∧ ¬H) ·
1− l′
Q0l (¬E | ¬H)
= l′ ·Ql(¬H) + (1− l
′) ·Ql(¬H)
= Ql(¬H)
(b) Rl,l′(E ∧ ¬H)
= (Ql(¬H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
l′
Q0l (E | ¬H)
+Ql(¬H ∧ ¬E ∧ •) ·
1− l′
Q0l (¬E | ¬H)
+Ql(H ∧ •))(E ∧ ¬H)
= Ql(¬H ∧ ¬E ∧ ¬H) ·
l′
Q0l (¬E | ¬H)
= Ql(¬E ∧ ¬H) ·
l′
Q0l (¬E | ¬H)
= Ql(¬E ∧ ¬H) ·
l′ ·Ql(¬H)
Ql(¬E ∧ ¬H)
= l′ ·Ql(¬H)
(c) R0l,l′(E | ¬H) =
Rl,l′(E ∧ ¬H)
Rl,l′(¬H)
=
l′ ·Ql(¬H)
Ql(¬H)
= l′
4. Using the preceding items and by definition of r.
5. (a) Ql(¬H) = 1−Ql(H) = 1− PA(H)
(b) Rl,l′(E)
= (Ql(¬H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
l′
Q0l (E | ¬H)
+Ql(¬H ∧ ¬E ∧ •) ·
1− l′
Q0l (¬E | ¬H)
+
Ql(H ∧ •))(E)
= Ql(¬H ∧E) ·
l′
Q0l (E | ¬H)
+Ql(H ∧ E)
= l′ ·Ql(¬H) + l · PA(H)
= l′ · (1− PA(H)) + l · PA(H)
(c) R̂l,l′(H) = R
0
l,l′(H |E) =
Rl,l′(E ∧H)
Rl,l′(E)
=
Ql(E ∧H)
Rl,l′(E)
=
l · PA(H)
l′ · (1− PA(H)) + l · PA(H)
=
l/l′ · PA(H)
(1− PA(H)) + l/l′ · PA(H)
=
r · PA(H)
1 + (r − 1) · PA(H)
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6. (a) Q0l (E | ¬H) =
Ql(E ∧ ¬H)
Ql(¬H)
=
PA(E ∧ ¬H)
1− PA(H)
= P 0A(E | ¬H)
(b) Ql(¬H)
= (PA(H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
l
P 0A(E |H)
+ PA(H ∧ ¬E ∧ •) ·
1− l
P 0A(¬E |H)
+ PA(¬H ∧ •))(¬H)
= PA(¬H)
(c) Ql(¬E ∧ ¬H)
= (PA(H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
l
P 0A(E |H)
+ PA(H ∧ ¬E ∧ •) ·
1− l
P 0A(¬E |H)
+ PA(¬H ∧ •))(E ∧ ¬H)
= PA(¬E ∧ ¬H)
(d) Q0l (¬E | ¬H) =
Ql(¬E ∧ ¬H)
Ql(¬H)
=
PA(¬E ∧ ¬H)
PA(¬H)
= P 0A(¬E | ¬H)
(e) Rl,l′(X)
= Ql(¬H ∧ E ∧X) ·
l′
P 0A(E | ¬H)
+Ql(¬H ∧ ¬E ∧X) ·
(1− l′)
P 0A(¬E | ¬H)
+Ql(H ∧ x)
= PA(¬H ∧ E ∧X) ·
l′
P 0A(E | ¬H)
+ PA(¬H ∧ ¬E ∧X) ·
1− l′
P 0A(¬E | ¬H)
+ PA(H ∧E ∧X) ·
l
P 0A(E |H)
+ PA(H ∧ ¬E ∧X) ·
1− l
P 0A(¬E |H)
The final credal state P̂A(H) for H does not depend on the way l and l
′ are chosen so that
r = l/l′. In other words the protocol is independent from the way r is written as a fraction.
This form of independence will be referred to as the local representation independence of
the SLTMR reasoning method. A symmetry argument yields that performing the respective
Adams conditioning steps in the other order leads to the same result.
However, if Bayesian conditioning is performed after the first Adams transformation, the
result depends on the representation of the likelihood ratio as a fraction. To see this one may
derive from the definition of Ql(E) that Ql(E) = l · PA(H) + PA(¬H ∧ E) so that
Q0l (H |E) =
Ql(H ∧ E)
Ql(E)
= (PA(H ∧ E) ·
l
P 0A(E |H)
·
1
Ql(E)
=
l · PA(H)
l · PA(H) + PA(¬H ∧E)
Given that PA(¬H ∧ E) > 0, the latter result depends on l, that is on the choice of l and
l′ given r. Thus the first stage, obtained after a single Adams transformation is not locally
representation independent, and for that reason not globally representation independent either.
3.4 Belief kinetics II: double likelihood Adams conditioning
In this paragraph the proporties of double likelihood Adams conditioning are considered in de-
tail. This conditioning mechanism fits best with likelihood ratio transfer as it simultaneously
incorporates two likelihoods l and l′. The likelihoods l and l′ may in turn have been obtained
by choosing for a given likelihood ratio r (which A may have received from B) appropriate
values such that r = l
l′
:
Ql,l′ = PA(H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
l
P 0A(E |H)
+ PA(H ∧ ¬E ∧ •) ·
1− l
P 0A(¬E |H)
+
PA(¬H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
l′
P 0A(E | ¬H)
+ PA(¬H ∧ ¬E ∧ •) ·
1− l′
P 0A(¬E | ¬H)
Subsequent conditioning with respect to E is given by:
Q̂l,l′ = Q
0
l.l′(• | E) (5)
For double likelihood Adams conditioning we will prove a result similar to Theorem 3.3.1 but
with fewer conditions, though at the cost of a more involved statement of the equations in the
Theorem.
Theorem 3.4.1. Given the assumptions and definitions mentioned above, and moreover as-
suming l/l = l′/l′ = PA(H)/PA(H) = PA(E)/PA(E) = 1, the following equations and condi-
tional equations are true for l, l′, r, PA, Ql,l′ , and Q̂l,l′ :
1. PA(H∧E)
PA(H∧E)
= PA(H∧¬E)
PA(H∧¬E)
= 1→ Q0l,l′(E |H) = l
2. PA(H∧¬E)
PA(H∧¬E)
= PA(¬H∧¬E)
PA(¬H∧¬E)
= 1→ Q0l,l′(E | ¬H) = l
′
3. Q̂l,l′(X) =
r · P 0A(X |H ∧E) · PA(H) + P
0
A(X | ¬H ∧ E) · PA(¬H)
r · PA(H∧E)
PA(H∧E)
· PA(H) +
PA(¬H∧E)
PA(¬H∧E)
· PA(¬H)
4. Q̂l,l′(H) =
r · PA(H∧E)
PA(H∧E)
· PA(H)
r · PA(H∧E)
PA(H∧E)
· PA(H) +
PA(¬H∧E)
PA(¬H∧E)
· PA(¬H)
From these facts the following conclusions can be drawn:
• Performing single likelihood Adams conditioning for L0(E|H) = l and for L0(E|¬H) = l′
under the conditions of Theorem 3.3.1 in either order is equivalent to double likelihood
Adams conditioning.
• Double likelihood Adams conditioning16 for likelihoods l and l′ transforms PA in to a
probability function P ′A(= Q̂l,l′) with the following properties (under reasonable condi-
tions): (i) the prior odds of A for H are protected in the sense that P ′A(H) = PA(H),
(ii) for P ′A: L
0(E,H) = l, and (iii) for P ′A: L
0(E,¬H) = l′.
• Double likelihood Adams conditioning is just one of many possible transformations that
achieves the above requirements. Whether or not this particular transformation has a
preferred status depends on the circumstances. Whether or not A, upon obtaining from
B an update of a likelihood pair or of a likelihood ratio, ought to be able to incorporate
that new information by means of a canonical probability transformation of their belief
state, and if so which transformation can play that role, is left undecided at the current
level of abstraction.
16Alternative names: simultaneous Adams conditioning, or likelihood pair Adams conditioning.
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• Because l and l′ do not occur in the expression for Q̂l,l′(X) double likelihood Adams
conditioning is globally representation independent. This feature of double likelihood
Adams conditioning is in contrast with single likelihood Adams conditioning which is
not globally representation independent.
• In view of Theorem 3.3.1 the following answer to the question mentioned in the first
lines of the paper is obtained: only by working with a likelihood ratio and by processing
both ratios simultaneously global representation independence is obtained.
Proof. As double likelihood Adams conditioning may be considered the more important con-
ditioning transformation, in comparison to single likelihood Adams conditioning, the proofs
have been worked out in full detail without making use of calculations for the single likelihood
case.
1. (a) Ql,l′(E ∧H)
= (PA(H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
l
P 0A(E |H)
+ PA(H ∧ ¬E ∧ •) ·
1− l
P 0A(¬E |H)
+
PA(¬H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
l′
P 0A(E | ¬H)
+ PA(¬H ∧ ¬E ∧ •) ·
1− l′
P 0A(¬E | ¬H)
)(E ∧H)
= PA(H ∧E) ·
l
P 0A(E |H)
= l ·
PA(H ∧ E)
PA(H ∧ E)
· PA(H)
(b) Ql,l′(H)
= (PA(H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
l
P 0A(E |H)
+ PA(H ∧ ¬E ∧ •) ·
1− l
P 0A(¬E |H)
+
PA(¬H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
l′
P 0A(E | ¬H)
+ PA(¬H ∧ ¬E ∧ •) ·
1− l′
P 0A(¬E | ¬H)
)(H)
= (PA(H ∧ E) ·
l
P 0A(E |H)
+ PA(H ∧ ¬E) ·
1− l
P 0A(¬E |H)
=
PA(H ∧ E)
PA(H ∧ E)
· l · PA(H) +
PA(H ∧ ¬E)
PA(H ∧ ¬E)
· (1− l) · PA(H) =
= (l ·
PA(H ∧ E)
PA(H ∧ E)
+ (1− l) ·
PA(H ∧ ¬E)
PA(H ∧ ¬E)
) · PA(H)
(c) Q0l,l′(E |H) =
Ql,l′(E ∧H)
Ql,l′(H)
=
l · PA(H∧E)
PA(H∧E)
l · PA(H∧E)
PA(H∧E)
+ (1 − l) · PA(H∧¬E)
PA(H∧¬E)
2. (a) Ql,l′(E ∧ ¬H)
= (PA(H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
l
P 0A(E |H)
+ PA(H ∧ ¬E ∧ •) ·
1− l
P 0A(¬E |H)
+
PA(¬H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
l′
P 0A(E | ¬H)
+ PA(¬H ∧ ¬E ∧ •) ·
1− l′
P 0A(¬E | ¬H)
)(E ∧ ¬H)
= PA(¬H ∧ E) ·
l′
P 0A(E | ¬H)
= l′ ·
PA(E ∧ ¬H)
PA(E ∧ ¬H)
· PA(¬H)
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(b) Ql,l′(¬H)
= (PA(H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
l
P 0A(E |H)
+ PA(H ∧ ¬E ∧ •) ·
1− l
P 0A(¬E |H)
+
PA(¬H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
l′
P 0A(E | ¬H)
+ PA(¬H ∧ ¬E ∧ •) ·
1− l′
P 0A(¬E | ¬H)
)(¬H)
= (PA(¬H ∧ E) ·
l′
P 0A(E | ¬H)
+ PA(¬H ∧ ¬E) ·
1− l′
P 0A(¬E | ¬H)
= l′ ·
PA(¬H ∧ E)
PA(¬H ∧ E)
· PA(¬H) + (1− l
′) ·
PA(¬H ∧ ¬E)
PA(¬H ∧ ¬E)
· PA(¬H)
Now the argument for part 2 of the Theorem follows in the same way as the argu-
ment for part 1 in item 1c above.
(c) Q0l,l′(E | ¬H) =
Ql,l′(E ∧ ¬H)
Ql,l′(¬H)
=
l′ · PA(¬H)
PA(¬H)
= l′
3. (a) Ql,l′(E)
= (PA(H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
l
P 0A(E |H)
+ PA(H ∧ ¬E ∧ •) ·
1− l
P 0A(¬E |H)
+
PA(¬H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
l′
P 0A(E | ¬H)
+ PA(¬H ∧ ¬E ∧ •) ·
1− l′
P 0A(¬E | ¬H)
)(E)
= PA(H ∧E) ·
l
P 0A(E |H)
+ PA(¬H ∧ E) ·
l′
P 0A(E | ¬H)
= l ·
PA(H ∧ E)
PA(H ∧ E)
· PA(H) + l
′ ·
PA(¬H ∧ E)
PA(¬H ∧ E)
· PA(¬H)
(b) Ql,l′(X ∧ E)
= (PA(H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
l
P 0A(E |H)
+ PA(H ∧ ¬E ∧ •) ·
1− l
P 0A(¬E |H)
+
PA(¬H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
l′
P 0A(E | ¬H)
+ PA(¬H ∧ ¬E ∧ •) ·
1− l′
P 0A(¬E | ¬H)
)(X ∧E)
= PA(X ∧H ∧ E) ·
l
P 0A(E |H)
+ PA(X ∧ ¬H ∧ E) ·
l′
P 0A(E | ¬H)
= PA(X ∧H ∧ E) ·
l · PA(H)
PA(E ∧H)
+ PA(X ∧ ¬H ∧ E) ·
l′ · PA(¬H)
PA(E ∧ ¬H)
= l · P 0A(X |H ∧E) · PA(H) + l
′ · P 0A(X | ¬H ∧ E) · PA(¬H)
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(c) Q̂l,l′(X) =
Ql,l′(X ∧E)
Ql,l′(E)
=
l · P 0A(X |H ∧ E) · PA(H) + l
′ · P 0A(X | ¬H ∧ E) · PA(¬H)
l · PA(H∧E)
PA(H∧E)
· PA(H) + l′ ·
PA(¬H∧E)
PA(¬H∧E)
· PA(¬H)
=
l′ · (l/l′ · P 0A(X |H ∧ E) · PA(H) + P
0
A(X | ¬H ∧ E) · PA(¬H))
l′(l/l′ · PA(H∧E)
PA(H∧E)
· PA(H) +
PA(¬H∧E)
PA(¬H∧E)
· PA(¬H))
=
r · P 0A(X |H ∧ E) · PA(H) + P
0
A(X | ¬H ∧ E) · PA(¬H)
r · PA(H∧E)
PA(H∧E)
· PA(H) +
PA(¬H∧E)
PA(¬H∧E)
· PA(¬H)
4. Q̂l,l′(H) =
r · P 0A(H |H ∧ E) · PA(H) + P
0
A(H | ¬H ∧ E) · PA(¬H)
r · PA(H∧E)
PA(H∧E)
· PA(H) +
PA(¬H∧E)
PA(¬H∧E)
· PA(¬H)
=
r · PA(H∧E)
PA(H∧E)
· PA(H)
r · PA(H∧E)
PA(H∧E)
· PA(H) +
PA(¬H∧E)
PA(¬H∧E)
· PA(¬H)
4 Proposition kinetics for LRTMR
In this Section it is assumed that initially E is not yet included in the proposition space
SA of A. This assumption deviate from the assumptions underlying single likelihood Adams
conditioning as well as double likelihood Adams conditioning.
The following scenario indicates why it may be reasonable to assume that the evidence
proposition is initially not known to A and for that reason not included in its proposition
space SA.
1. A may ask B to provide evidence of relevance concerning proposition H without having
a particular and technically specific form of such evidence in mind; for instance A may
suggest B to consider “something with DNA” instead of a more precise indication of
what sort of technology is to be used.
2. A mere name E for a proposition yet to be designed is agreed upon between A and B
intended to be used for expressing what B proposes that can be said about evidence for
H that is available to B.
3. B may subsequently propose to A to make use of (to instantiate the template with) an
evidence proposition “of the type T ”, and A may agree upon this plan with B. In other
words it is greed that E will have type T .
4. B communicates an abstract form Ea of EB to A, which will serve as the public version
of A’s evidence proposition, meant for the interactive reasoning in cooperation with A.
5. A and B agree to use E as the name for Ea.
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6. A confirms that E is sufficiently new given its background information. This means that
the current PA has not come about by conditioning or constraining (the most prominent
alternative revision mechanism in the imprecise case) on any proposition comparable to
E. If no confirmation along these lines can be obtained by A this thread of interaction
with B is aborted.
7. A makes the plan to incorporate E in its proposition space (proposition space family)
using proposition kinetics:
• the plan is to be carried out once relevant probabilistic information is made available
to A by B;
• A need not become fully aware of the meaning of E (i.e. of EB) at any stage during
the reasoning process;
• Amust be able to embed enough information regarding Ea in its background knowl-
edge base KB that in a forthcoming situation it may recognize a (high) degree of
similarity with the contents of a new proposition say E′ which may be proposed to
A by the same or another forensic expert (in the same, or another (?) case) with
the effect that A must refuse subsequent Bayesian conditioning on E′.17
8. Therefore at this stage A is ready to receive information related to the original beliefs in
E (i.e. EB) and H . Preferably this is done by way of B first sending to A a likelihood
ratio r = LR0B(E,H,¬H). A will use this information to expand its proposition space
with E, and (ii) to extend its (precise) belief function.
Here it is assumed that B will report to A about E what it actually thinks (believes
about) of EB. In some circumstances B reports its past beliefs rather than current
beliefs (indeed B may already have established that PB(E) = 1 before communicating
a likelihood ratio r = LR0B(E,H,¬H) to A. But once PB(E) = 1, unavoidably (for B)
LRB(E,H,¬H) = 1 just as well, a value not worth of being communicated.18
9. A and B may now proceed with the protocol as it has been specified above without
proposition kinetics.
4.1 Proposition kinetics in a four element proposition space: global
representation independence
It will be assumed that initially H is in the proposition space of A while E is not. The
simplest nontrivial proposition space SA has a single generator H which is neither ⊤ nor ⊥
so that ⊤,⊥, H , and ¬H are the four elements of SA = SA(H). Initially it is assumed that
10 < PA(H) = p < 1.
It is then assumed that A receives from B the information that LR0B(E,H,¬H) = r with
r > 0. Extending its proposition space SA with E leads to a proposition space with two
generators H and E, and 16 elements:
|SA(H,E)| = {⊤,⊥, H,¬H,E,¬E,H ∧ E,H ∧ ¬E,¬H ∧ E,¬H ∧ ¬E}
17This refusal is essential only after a reasoning step involving conditioning on E has been performed.
18This is a difficult point as B is unlikely to agree with A on the use of EB , to begin with, if B is subsequently
unable to say anything relevant (though unknown to A) about its findings on PB(E). The fact that B engages
in the protocol at all provides statistically relevant information to A which A can, but should not, use for a
subjective update of its priors.
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In order to specify a belief function QA on this extende proposition space it satisfies to specify
besides QA(H) = p (inherited from PA the values Q
0
A(E |H) = l and Q
0
A(E | ¬H) = l
′.
Now it is assumed that upon receiving the trusted information that LR0B(E,H,¬H) = r,
A guesses values l and l′ for the underlying ratios (undisclosed by B) such that r = l
l′
. A
applies proposition kinetics by simultaneously extending SA to SA(H,E) and by specifying
QA so that QA(H) = p, Q
0
A(E |H) = l and Q
0
A(E |H) = l
′ (for the chosen values l and l′).
The next phase in LRTMR is that A receives the information that PB(E) = 1 (the evidence
proposition is found to hold true by trusted agent B) and A processes this information by
applying Bayesian conditioning to the evidence proposition E, thereby obtaining its posterior
belief function Q̂A = P
′0(• |E). The only probability worth evaluating is Q̂A(H):
Q̂A(H) = Q
0
A(• |E)(H) = Q
0
A(H |E)
=
Q0A(H | E) ·QA(H)
Q0A(E |H) ·QA(H) +Q
0
A(E | ¬H) ·QA(¬H)
=
l · PA(H)
l · PA(H) + l′ · PA(¬H)
=
l/l′ · PA(H)
l/l′ · PA(H) + PA(¬H)
=
r · PA(H)
r · PA(H) + 1− PA(H)
=
r · PA(H)
1 + (r − 1) · PA(H)
Evaluating Q̂A(H) produces precisely the value as required in the outline description of
LRTMR in Paragraph 3.2 above. This fact can be interpreted as a sufficient indication for
the representation independence of LRTMR in the case of proposition kinetics with a prior
proposition space generated by the hypothesis proposition. Under the constraint of a single
proposition generated proposition space global representation independence is guaranteed.
4.2 Proposition kinetics on an arbitrary proposition space: local rep-
resentation independence
The situation may be reconsidered in the case of a proposition space SA which is generated
by two propositions H and L, L now playing the role of the second hypothesis proposition.
Upon receiving from B the information that LR0B(E,H,¬H) = r with r > 0, A extends its
proposition space to SA = SA(H,L) to SA(H,L,E). In order to have a belief function QA on
this space extending the prior belief function PA on the prior proposition space SA, A must
choose the following likelihoods: Q0A(E | H ∧ L) = u, Q
0
A(E | H ∧ ¬L) = v, Q
0
A(E | ¬H ∧
L) = u′, and Q0A(E | ¬H ∧ ¬L) = v
′. These values must be chosen in such a manner that
LRA(E,H,¬H) = r will hold. Therefore it is required that (with respect to QA):
r = LR0A(E,H,¬H) =
L0A(E,H)
L0A(E,¬H)
=
Q0A(E |H)
Q0A(E | ¬H)
=
QA(E ∧H)
QA(H)
·
QA(¬H)
QA(E ∧ ¬H)
=
QA(E ∧H ∧ L) +QA(E ∧H ∧ ¬L)
QA(H)
·
QA(¬H)
QA(E ∧ ¬H ∧ L) +QA(E ∧ ¬H ∧ ¬L)
=
u ·QA(H ∧ L) + v ·QA(H ∧ ¬L)
QA(H)
·
QA(¬H)
u′ ·QA(¬H ∧ L) + v′ ·QA(¬H ∧ ¬L)
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The following probabilities can be calculated:
QA(E) = u ·QA(H ∧ L) + v ·QA(H ∧ ¬L) + u′ ·QA(¬H ∧ L) + v′ ·QA(¬H ∧ ¬L) and
QA(E ∧H) = u ·QA(H ∧ L) + v ·QA(H ∧ ¬L).
Upon receiving the information that (according to B) PB(E) = 1, A will perform Bayesian
conditioning resulting in the posterior belief function Q̂A = Q
0
A(• | E). Calculating Q̂A(H)
produces:
Q̂A(H) = Q
0
A(• |E)(H) = Q
0
A(H |E) =
QA(H ∧E)
QA(E)
=
u ·QA(H ∧ L) + v ·QA(H ∧ ¬L)
u ·QA(H ∧ L) + v ·QA(H ∧ ¬L) + u′ ·QA(¬H ∧ L) + v′ ·QA(¬H ∧ ¬L)
=
u ·QA(H ∧ L) + v ·QA(H ∧ ¬L)
u ·QA(H ∧ L) + v ·QA(H ∧ ¬L) +
u·QA(H∧L)+v·QA(H∧¬L)
r
· QA(¬H)
QA(H)
=
1
1 + 1
r
· QA(¬H)
QA(H)
=
r ·QA(H)
1 + (r − 1) ·QA(H)
=
r · PA(H)
1 + (r − 1) · PA(H)
It may be concluded that in the case of two generators for SA and an arbitrary guess for
all new probabilities (upon introducing E as a new generator) representation independence
(with respect to H) is obtained. Using a similar proof it can be shown that representation
independence generalizes to an arbitrary number of generators for SA.
4.3 Proposition kinetics for a 6 element proposition space: failure of
global representation independence
Global representation independence is a different matter as will be found by considering an
example. Calculating Q̂A(L) produces:
Q̂A(L) = Q
0
A(• | E)(L) = Q
0
A(L | E) =
QA(L ∧E)
QA(E)
=
u′ ·QA(H ∧ L) + v ·QA(¬H ∧ L)
u ·QA(H ∧ L) + v ·QA(H ∧ ¬L) + u′ ·QA(¬H ∧ L) + v′ ·QA(¬H ∧ ¬L)
Now consider as an example the case that QA(H ∧ L) = QA(H ∧ ¬L) = QA(¬H ∧ L) =
QA(¬H ∧ ¬L) =
1
4 . Then the requirement on u, v, u
′ and v′ simplifies to: r =
u+ v
u′ + v′
, and
Q̂A(L) simplifies as follows: Q̂A(L) =
u′ + v
u+ v + u′ + v′
. Now choosing u′ = v′ = 13 and r =
3
2
we find u + v = 1, for instance u = 37 and v =
4
7 or alternatively u =
4
7 and v =
3
7 . In
these two cases Q̂A(L) takes different values. In the first case Q̂A(L) =
u′ + v
u+ v + u′ + v′
=
1/3 + 4/7
3/7 + 4/7 + 1/3 + 1/3
whereas in the second case: Q̂A(L) =
1/3 + 3/7
3/7 + 4/7 + 1/3 + 1/3
. It fol-
lows that when SA has two or more generating propositions global representation independence
fails.
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4.4 Bayesian conditioning followed by Jeffrey conditioning
The process specified in Paragraph 4.2 has two disadvantages: failure of global representation
independence, and pollution of the belief function with meaningless (guessed) values, due
to the fact that the mere availability of a new likelihood ratio leaves open many degrees of
freedom. The second disadvantage, however, is immaterial because the first issue stands in
the way of chaining the reasoning pattern with subsequent reasoning steps taking the obtained
posterior belief function as a prior.
The following process is plausible for A upon it receiving the information that trusted agent
B’s beliefs imply LR0B(E,H,¬H) = r. First use the new information on E in relation to H to
compute a new (revised) belief p̂ in H according to the process as specified in Paragraph 4.1:
p̂ =
r · PA(H)
1 + (r − 1) · PA(H)
This first step involves proposition kinetics. In the second step, however, the proposition space
of A is not extended, instead merely a revision of the belief function is performed.
Recall that Jeffrey conditioning (with parameter p on proposition H) works as follows
P̂p,H = p · P
0(• |H) + (1− p) · P 0(• | ¬H)
The revision of PA is found by the following application of Jeffrey conditioning:
P̂A = P̂p̂,H =
r · PA(H)
1 + (r − 1) · PA(H)
· P 0(• |H) + (1−
r · PA(H)
1 + (r − 1) · PA(H)
) · P 0(• | ¬H)
The two stage belief revision process just outlined produces a posterior belief state which may
serve as a prior belief state for a subsequent reasoning step.
4.5 Adams followed by Bayes equals Jeffrey after Bayes
At first sight it seems that the case where E is contained in the proposition space of A is the
more general case. Double likelihood Adams conditioning allows the independent processing,
in terms of belief state revision by A, of an incoming likelihood ratio from B. If, however
the subsequent phase of Bayes conditioning is included, the path involving proposition space
kinetics turns out to be the more general one. Below it will be proven that both revision
processes commute. I will first establish the equivalence of both approaches by way of direct
calculation. Subsequently a concise manner of formulating this and other equivalences with
the help of conditioning combinators is provided.
Upon receiving a message LR0B(E,H,¬H) = r A may first create a second proposition
space generated by H and E and proceed as in 4.1, thereby producing a posterior probability
p̂ =
r · PA(H)
1 + (r − 1) · PA(H)
for H after Bayes conditioning in the auxiliary proposition space.
Now SA containsE which allows Bayes conditioning on E, thus obtaining as an intermediate
result Q = P 0(• |E). Subsequently Jeffrey conditioning with parameter p̂ and with respect to
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H may be applied to the intermediate probability function Q thus obtaining: Pp as follows:
P̂ = p̂ ·Q0(• |H) + (1− p̂) ·Q0(• | ¬H)
P̂ is a plausible result of performing the combination of receiving a likelihood ratio r (for Ev
and H) and a confirmation of E from the prior belief PA. We consider P̂ (x) for an arbitrary
proposition x in SA:
P̂ (x) = (p̂ ·Q0(• |H) + (1− p̂) ·Q0(• | ¬H))(x)
= (p̂ ·
Q(• ∧H)
Q(H)
+ (1− p̂) ·
Q0(• ∧ ¬H)
Q(¬H)
)(x)
= (p̂ ·
P 0A(• ∧H | E)
P 0A(H | E)
+ (1 − p̂) ·
P 0A(• ∧ ¬H |E)
P 0A(¬H | E)
)(x)
= (p̂ ·
PA(• ∧H ∧ E) · PA(E)
PA(E) · PA(H ∧ E)
+ (1− p̂) ·
PA(• ∧ ¬H ∧ E) · PA(E)
PA(E) · PA(¬H ∧ E)
)(x)
= (p̂ ·
PA(• ∧H ∧ E)
PA(H ∧ E)
+ (1− p̂) ·
PA(• ∧ ¬H ∧ E)
PA(¬H ∧ E)
)(x)
= (p̂ · P 0A(• |H ∧ E) + (1 − p̂) · P
0
A(• ∧ ¬H ∧E))(x)
= p̂ · P 0A(x |H ∧ E) + (1− p̂) · P
0
A(x ∧ ¬H ∧ E)
=
r · PA(H) · P 0A(x |H ∧ E)
1 + (r − 1) · PA(H)
+ (1−
r · PA(H)
1 + (r − 1) · PA(H)
) · P 0A(x ∧ ¬H ∧ E)
=
r · PA(H) · P 0A(x |H ∧ E)
1 + (r − 1) · PA(H)
+ (
1− PA(H)
1 + (r − 1) · PA(H)
) · P 0A(x ∧ ¬H ∧ E)
=
r · PA(H) · P 0A(x |H ∧ E) + PA(¬H) · P
0
A(x ∧ ¬H ∧E)
1 + (r − 1) · PA(H)
It turns out that under the assumption that PA(E ∧H)/PA(E ∧H) = PA(E ∧H)/PA(E ∧
H) = PA(E∧¬H)/PA(E∧¬H) = PA(¬E∧H)/PA(¬E∧H) = PA(¬E∧¬H)/PA(¬E∧¬H) =
1, P̂ (x) is identical to Q̂l,l′(x) as found in Theorem 3.4.1. This identity serves as a confirmation
of the validity each of the two pathways which derive the same probability function on the
same proposition space: (i) double Adams conditioning followed by Bayes conditioning and,
(ii) the following sequence of steps:
1. starting a new proposition space with generator H , the probability being taken from
PA,
2. proposition kinetics in the new proposition space adding E to it such that the acquired
likelihood ratio fits,
3. Bayes conditioning with proposition kinetics in the auxiliary workspace,
4. extracting the posterior probability p̂ of H from the auxiliary proposition space,
5. Bayes conditioning with proposition kinetics on the original (prior) proposition space of
A,
6. and finally Jeffrey conditioning (with respect to p̂ and H) on the result of the last step.
29
4.6 Proposition kinetics in advance of double likelihood Adams con-
ditioning
Starting with a belief state (SA, PA) not containing proposition constant E, A may first
expand its proposition space of a base rate inclusion [bri;E; p] with 0 < p < 1. Subsequently
A may apply a double likelihood Adams transformation with label dlac;E,H ; l, l′ (l and l′
both nonzero, and then A may apply Bayesian conditioning without kinetics (label [bc;E]).
It follows from the result in Paragraph 4.5 that the resulting proposition space is inde-
pendent from the choice of p. Thus proposition kinetics may be placed in advance of double
likelihood Adams conditioning and subsequent Bayes conditioning.
4.7 Limited merits of Adams conditioning
Double likelihood Adams conditioning with label [dlac;E,H ; l, l′] with l/l′ 6= 0 transforms a
belief state (SA, PA) which involves a generator E and a proposition H into (SA, P̂A) in such
a way that (i) the prior odds of A regarding H remain invariant i.e. P̂A(H) = PA(H), and (ii)
LR0A(E,H,¬H) = r. In this update E and H are treated differently, so that the subjectively
given belief H is protected, while A’s belief assertion E which is supposed to be sensitive to
scientifically grounded observation is adapted:
PA(H ∧ E)
PA(H ∧ E)
=
PA(H ∧ ¬E)
PA(H ∧ ¬E)
= 1→ P̂A(E) = l.PA(H) + l
′.(1− PA(H))
so that P̂A(E) differs from PA(E) for most choices of l and l
′. The Adams transformation
assigns different status to A’s priors regarding H and E, regarding A’s prior for E of lesser
importance. Perhaps this aspect of Adams transformation disqualifies it from the perspective
of subjective probability theory.
5 Fallacies and single likelihood transfer based reasoning
Instead of transferring a likelihood pair (simultaneously or in consecutive separate messages)
or transferring a likelihood ratio, merely a single likelihood may be transferred by B to A.
Typically in the literature on forensic reasoning the prosecution would expect MOE to provide
such information to TOF.
The resulting inferences are often qualified as fallacies.19 Transposing the conditional and
the prosecutor’s fallacy may be considered failed examples of attempts to design and use meth-
ods for single likelihood transfer mediated reasoning (SLTMR). I will first focus on the so-called
transposition of the conditional, a phrase attributed to Lindley by Fienberg & Finkelstein [21].
5.1 What is wrong with transposition of the conditional?
Transposing the conditional is often portrayed as making the mistake that P 0(H | E) =
P 0(E |H) which is admittedly easily refuted unless one of three “unlikely” conditions holds:
P (E) = 0, or P (H) = 0, or P (H) = P (E).
19For a philosophical discussion of fallacies in the context of Bayesian reasoning I refer to Korb [26]
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I consider this way of looking at what is wrong with transposition of the conditional (TOC)
rather implausible.20 In my view a more plausible way of looking at it takes into account the
setting of new information and corresponding belief state revision. Instead of transposition of
the conditional I will speak of transposition of the likelihood, which of course amounts to the
same. Now assuming that agent A receives new information concerning the single likelihood
P 0A(E |H), say P
0
A(E |H) = l. Is there a justification for A to infer that after performing an
appropriate belief revision resulting in P̂A, the following identity may be correct:
P̂A
0
(H | E) = l(= P 0A(E |H))
A plausible intuition runs as follows: if P 0A(E |H)) is updated then P
0
A(H |E)) must be updated
as well, perhaps not as much but in any case to some extent. And then it is suggested that
the same modification applies, which is the fallacy at hand.
However, as will be shown below: the intuition is wrong: no update of a transposed likeli-
hood can be inferred from the change of its transposed likelihood. Moreover there is nothing
wrong in principle with receiving an update of a single likelihood and updating one’s subjective
probabilities accordingly: that is the subject of Adams conditioning. Following Theorem 3.3.1
it may be assumed that P̂A is obtained from PA via single likelihood Adams conditioning.
P̂A = PA(H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
l
P 0A(E |H)
+ PA(H ∧ ¬E ∧ •) ·
1− l
P 0A(¬E |H)
+ PA(¬H ∧ •)
The calculation of P̂A
0
(H | E) is covered in the following Theorem. The same conditions as
for Theorem 3.3.1 are assumed.
Theorem 5.1.1. Under the assumption that single likelihood Adams conditioning is an an
appropriate belief transformation for A in response to the reception of an update of a single
likelihood the following holds.
If P̂A is the posterior belief of A upon acquiring knowledge that P
0
A(E | H) = l then
P̂A
0
(H | E) = P 0A(H |E).
Proof. P̂A
0
(H | E) = Q0l (H | E) =
Ql(H ∧ E)
Ql(E)
=
(PA(H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
l
P 0
A
(E |H)
)(H ∧E)
(PA(H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
l
P 0
A
(E |H)
+ PA(¬H ∧ •))(E)
=
PA(H ∧ E) ·
l
P 0
A
(E |H)
PA(H ∧ E) ·
l
P 0
A
(E |H)
+ PA(¬H ∧ E)
=
=
l · PA(H)
l · PA(H) + PA(¬H ∧ E)
=
P 0A(E |H) · PA(H)
P 0A(E |H) · PA(H) + PA(¬H ∧ E)
=
=
PA(E∧H)
PA(H)
· PA(H)
PA(E∧H)
PA(H)
· PA(H) + PA(¬H ∧ E)
=
PA(E ∧H)
PA(E ∧H) + PA(¬H ∧ E)
=
PA(E ∧H)
PA(E)
= P 0A(H |E)
20In Paragraph 3.1 the implausibility of TOC as an inference mechanism in the absence of belief revision
has already been argued in some detail.
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5.2 Prosecutor’s conditioning: a justifiable residue of the prosecu-
tor’s fallacy
It is sometimes claimed that reliable reasoning in forensics necessarily requires the balancing of
at least two scenario’s. Likelihood ratio transfer represents the communication of an evaluation
some form of comparison between two scenario’s. Transferring a single likelihood ratio from
MOE to TOF might be considered as a communication concerning merely a single scenario,
which may be considered problematic for that reason. I will show that there is no such
problem, at least not in principle.
The grounds for rejecting one sided reporting of evidence reside in the fact that MOE is
not supposed to know TOF’s prior beliefs. For the prosecutor, however, who I will refer to as
POC for “pioneer of claims”, it is acceptable to ask TOF about its prior beliefs and to seek
common ground with TOF on that matter in advance of formulating a claim in the form of
a strong belief in a hypothesis H , for instance asserting that a certain course of events took
place in a certain manner. After having established common ground with TOF concerning
shared beliefs joint reasoning may proceed. Here is an example. Because there are shared
beliefs no subscripts are introduced. If a subscript (holder) to these subjective probabilities
must be assigned then that will be TOF.
For propositional atoms Di for i ∈ n = {1, . . . , n} it is assumed that D1 ∨ . . . ∨ Dn = ⊤
and Di ∧Dj = ⊥ for different i, j ∈ n. Di expresses that focus is on individual i. Besides the
Di’s the proposition space of TOF has generators E and H . E satisfies E = D1 ∨ . . . ∨ Dk
for some given k < n. H ∧ Di expresses that individual i is considered the unique person
(and suspect) who carried out a certain action. Initially not much is known about H , and
the overall probability P (H) is rather low, and moreover H is unevenly distributed over k
individuals, each of whom attraction some attention as potential suspects. In the example H
has a single peak for individual 1, which models an uneven distribution of H .
In more detail the prior state is that TOF and POC agree upon the following (shared)
beliefs which they both maintain, including the relative height of p which is motivated by
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circumstantial evidence indicating individual 1 as a suspect.
P (Di) =
1
n
, 1 ≤ i ≤ n
P (H ∧D1) =
p
n
,
1
n
< p ≤ 1
P (H ∧Di) =
1− p
n− 1
·
1
n
, 1 < i ≤ n
P (H) =
1
n
P (E) =
k
n
P (E ∧Di) =
1
n
1 ≤ i ≤ k
P (E ∧Di) = 0 k ≤ i ≤ n
P (E ∧H) =
∑
i∈n
P (E ∧H ∧Di)
P (Di)
· P (Di) =
∑
i∈n
P (E ∧H ∧Di) =
=
∑
i∈k
P (E ∧H ∧Di) = P (E ∧H ∧D1) +
k∑
i=2
P (E ∧H ∧Di)
=
p
n
+ (k − 1) ·
1− p
n− 1
·
1
n
=
1
n
(p+ (1− p) ·
k − 1
n− 1
)
POC calls MOE for advice and is informed by MOE way of a single likelihood transfer that
P 0MOE(E |H) = 1. In other words, MOE advises POC to restrict the search for the perpetrator
to the members of a group characterised by E. POC agrees and requires of TOF that they
also restrict suspicions to individuals that satisfy E.
Using prosecutor’s fallacy (see Thompson & Shumann [42]) as a reasoning pattern, POC
and TOF may now infer P̂ (H ∧ D1) ≈ 1. For instance with p = 1/10, k = 100, n = 100.000
the following seems ro hold:
P̂ (H ∧D1) =
P (H ∧D1)
P (H ∧ E)
=
p
n
·
n
p+ (1− p) · k−1
n−1
=
p
n
·
100.000
1
10 + (1−
1
10 ) ·
100−1
100.000−1
≥
=
p
n
· 500.000
thereby deriving a very high posterior probability that the suspect is the perpetrator.
Alternatively (and without any justification either see Paragraph 5.1) TOF may upon
receiving and adopting the information that P 0(E | H) = 1 transpose the conditional, thus
obtaining P̂ 0(H |E) = 1 which together with P̂ 0(E |D1) = 1 leads to P̂ 0(H |D1) = 1 thereby
increasing P̂0(H ∧D1) to P0(D1), which in our example amounts to an increase of a factor 10.
Instead of an application of unjustified reasoning it is possible to use Adams conditioning in
order to capture the belief revision which TOF and POC may justifiably adopt upon learning
that P 0(E |H) = 1.
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Application of single likelihood Adams conditioning works as follows in this case:
P̂ = P (H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
l
P 0(E |H)
+ P (H ∧ ¬E ∧ •) ·
1− l
P 0(¬E |H)
+ P (¬H ∧ •)
= P (H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
1
P 0(E |H)
+ P (¬H ∧ •)
P̂ (H ∧D1) = (P (H ∧ E ∧ •) ·
1
P 0(E |H)
+ P (¬H ∧ •)(H ∧D1)
= P (H ∧ E ∧D1) ·
1
P 0(E |H)
+ P (¬H ∧ h ∧D1)
= P (H ∧D1) ·
P (H)
P (E ∧H)
=
p
n
·
1
n
·
1
1
n
· (p+ (1 − p) · k−1
n−1 )
=
1
n
·
p
p+ (1 − p) · k−1
n−1
= P (H ∧D1) ·
1
p+ (1− p) · k−1
n−1
The practical value of this conditioning step appears only when looking at an example. With
p = 1/10, k = 100, n = 100.000 one finds:
P̂ (H ∧D1) = P (H ∧D1) ·
1
1/10 + 9/10 · 9999.999
≥ P (H ∧D1) ·
1
1/10 + 9/10 · 100100.000
≥
P (H ∧D1) ·
1
1/10 + 9/10 · 100100.000
P (H ∧D1) ·
1
1/10 + 9/100
= P (H ∧D1) ·
100
19
Thus on the basis of a single likelihood obtained from MOE both TOF and POC have signifi-
cantly increased the belief that the suspect (person 1) has been the perpetrator: P 0(H |D1) ≈
P 0(H |D1) ·100/19. The use of approximation serves an expository purpose only while Adams
conditioning provides precise values for all posterior probabilities. This form of single likeli-
hood Adams conditioning may be referred to as prosecutor conditioning (conditioning on a
condition proposed by the prosecutor).
6 Sender-side aspects of LRTMR
In the previous chapters A represents the role of TOF who is receiving information concerning
likelihoods, likelihood ratio’s, and observed evidence from B who represents MOE. In the
setting of LRTMR, B operates as a sender of information. For B a repertoire of messages to
A can be distinguished.
1. < L0B(E,H) = l > (for a closed rational number expression l with 0 < l ≤ 1) is
the message that the likelihood of evidence proposition E with respect to hypothesis
proposition H is equal to l,
34
2. < L0B(E,¬H) = l > (for a closed rational number expression l with 0 < l ≤ 1) is the
message that the likelihood of evidence proposition E with respect to negated hypothesis
proposition H is equal to l,
3. < (L0B(E,H) = l&L
0
B(E,¬H) = l
′) > (for closed rational number expressions l, l′ with
0 < l, l′ ≤ 1) is the message that the likelihood pair of evidence proposition E with
respect to hypothesis proposition H is equal to (l, l′),
4. < LR0B(E,H,¬H) = r > (for a closed rational number expression r with 0 < r ≤ 1) is
the message that the likelihood ratio of evidence proposition E with respect to hypothesis
proposition H is equal to r,
5. < PB(E) = 1 > is the message that B considers evidence proposition E to be true.
6. < LR0B(E,H,¬H) = r&PB(E) = 1 > is the combined (simultaneous) message that
includes both < LR0B(E,H,¬H) = r > and < PB(E) = 1 >.
For a message < m > actions of the form sndB→A(< m >) may performed by agent B
resulting in the asynchronous21 and eventually successful transfer of the message < m > to
agent A. B may also perform internal actions, notably finding out likelihoods in advance of
transferral. findB(< L
0
B(E,H) = l >) represents the action of B coming to the belief that
P 0(E |H) should be given value l. Similarly findB(< L
0
B(E,¬H) = l >) represents the action
of B coming to the understanding that P 0(E | ¬H) should be given credence l. The action
confirm(< PB(E) = 1 >) represents B’s becoming aware that E is true.
B can carry out its communicative task towards A in many ways. Below only two options
for the behaviour of B will be considered, thereby limiting attention to the transfer of a
likelihood ratio.
6.1 Single message reporting: at odds with subjective probability?
In a single message B may reports to A.22 The report is transferred by a single asynchronous
send action:23
sndB→A(< LR
0
B(E,H,¬H) = r&PMOE(E) = 1 >)
This behaviour of B is an abstraction of the case that the expert (MOE) reports in a single
document, while a subsequent interview by A at best produces clarification, the outcome of
which is not reflected in a probabilistic transformation. Under these assumptions the following
conclusions can be drawn:
21An asynchronous message may arrive later than it was sent. A synchronous message arrives at the same
time. The price paid for synchrony is that sending a message may be delayed until the intended recipient is able
to receive the message. Thread algebra of [9] can be used to specify the deterministic concurrent cooperation
of TOF and MOE with either synchrounous or asynchronous message passing.
22It is assumed that a message may also contain explanatory text, but that part of the content is ignored at
the level of abstraction envisaged in this paper.
23In Willis et al. [50] (ENFSI guideline for evaluative reporting in forensic science) extensive mention is made
of the imperative that a likelihood ratio must be included in the report of a forensic expert. It is suggested
that evidence is not part of FE reporting. It is not obvious from this guideline if it advises (in the simplest
case) MOE to make use of to what I am calling single message reporting.
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1. At the time of sending B is at risk not to be not reporting its current beliefs. Indeed
if PB(E) = 1, a state of affairs which B is confirming and transmitting to A, then
unavoidably also r = LRB(E,H) = 1 (unless PB(H) = 0, which is a marginal case). So
the act of sending a likelihood ratio to A is redundant in this case, unless B is in fact
reporting a mix of current and past beliefs. Moreover it is assumed that B becoming
aware of PB(E) = 1 occurred strictly after B’s internal action of becoming aware of the
value of both likelihoods that make up the likelihood ratio reported as r.
2. To the extent that subjective belief theory insists that agents communicate the beliefs
they are actually holding, subjective belief theory cannot explain or justify the behaviour
of B.
3. Another theory of belief and probability is required for explaining single message re-
porting by B. For instance the use of temporal logic. However, it must be noticed
that the combination of timing with combination with conditionalization (e.g. Jeffrey
conditionalization) is a strikingly difficult topic. Weisberg’s paradox (Weisberg [49] and
the analysis of it in Huber [25] provide an indication of the complications involved.
6.2 Multiple message reporting: subjective probability compliance?
Instead of issuing a single message B may transmit two or more consecutive messages. We
consider the case that the first message contains a likelihood pair
sndB→A(< L
0
B(E,H) = l&L
0
B(E,¬H) = l
′ >)
and the second message, to be sent after the first message has been received by A, consists of
an an assertion of evidence:
sndB→A(< PB(E) = 1 >)
It is understood that when the first message is sent, B has not yet become aware that PB(E) =
1. So that in both cases B is reporting consistently with their actual beliefs.
At the receiving side A can process the first message from B by way of a double likelihood
Adams transformation, and upon receiving the second incoming message from B, A can be
proceed with Bayesian conditioning without proposition kinetics.
Under the assumption that (as understood from the perspective subjective probability
theory) an update of a likelihood pair as received from B is adequately reflected by means of
a corresponding double likelihood Adams transformation, it is the case that double message
reporting as described above is compliant at both sides with the requirements of subjective
probability theory.24
24On the transfer of likelihood pairs: Robertson, Vignaux & Berger in [35] (p. 447) indicate that it has become
standard (in paternity cases) that a likelihood ratio is conveyed in addition to the underlying likelihood pair.
Morisson & Enzinger [31] suggest to distinguish between Bayes factor and likelihood ratio and both notions
may have disparate relations with the respective underlying pairs.
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7 Concluding remarks: physical probabilities for MOE
In forensic logic there seems to an unbridgeable discrepancy between physical probabilities25
and subjective probabilities. Nevertheless, mathematically speaking these two mechanisms for
measuring uncertainty are quite similar.
Probability has both subjective and frequentistic (physical) aspects. There is no reason to
expect or to wish that one of these two views (or any of the views in between that have been
developed thus far) would, on the basis of philosophical reflection alone, emerge as a dominant
perspective on the concept of probability.
In forensic logic, and more generally wherever LRTMR may apply, there appears to be
room for both perspectives on probability. This position intentionally leaves room for worries
such as formulated in Risinger [34] (p. 9) “that likelihood ratios would be guessed because of
the permissiveness for substituting opinion for fact which subjectivism would allegedly grant a
forensic expert”. Distrust of the notion of subjective probability may promote the idea that a
frequentist viewpoint provides a self-explanatory conceptual framework. That position, how-
ever, is an illusion, as is witnessed by the circumstance that even gaining an understanding of
the fair binary coin leads to significant theoretical complexity (e.g. in Belot [2]). According
to some authors physical probabilities may be taken for subjective beliefs, see e.g. Weather-
son [48] who details “Lewis’ new principle”. This assertion rephrases the older Lewis principal
principle, which asserts that a chance (probability in the sense of a frequency) may be taken
for a belief of equal degree.
It may be claimed that whenever MOE is asked to produce a numerical value, e.g. a
likelihood ratio, an attempt must be made determine the value in an objective manner, leaving
little room for the introduction of subjective beliefs. Then notions of precision and accuracy
enter the picture, as well as the intuition that some “real” quantity is being measured. Such
an intuition can be accomodated by taking for, say, a likelihood ratio r = LR0MOE(E,H,¬H)
a rational number written in decimal notation without repetition, and given within an interval
[r − ǫ, r + ǫ], with ǫ a positive rational number. The number of decimals of r is a measure
of accuracy, while ǫ measures precision. A disadvantage of this approach, however, is that it
is not obvious how to apply the various probability transformations when intervals instead of
precise values are to be dealt with.
Although statistical processing at MOE side of a collection of belief functions may result
in a valuable data reduction, the resulting outputs, such as values within an interval are not
obviously compatible with the probability calculus at hand. Instead of doing statistics before
handing over the data to TOF, MOE may transfer to TOF a representative sample of data
(for instance a sample of values for the same likelihood ratio) so that TOF may itself perform
statistical processing in a later stage of its activity.
7.1 Multiple LR reporting by MOE
A compromise between expecting MOE to report a single precise likelihood ratio, and to ask
for an interval, is to propose MOE to report a collection of candidate likelihood ratios rather
than a single one. It will be expected that the collection contains its average value as a
25In Strevens [40] this terminology is discussed in some detail. Frequentistic probabilities are subsumed
under the category of physical probabilities in [40].
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member, so that, when asked a unique likelihood ratio can be chosen as the preferred precise
and definite result. Another message type is required. For each E,H and n ∈ N+ there is a
message type:
< LR0MOE(E,H,¬H) ∈ {r1, . . . , rn} >
The meaning of this message is that according to MOE each of r1, . . . , rn is a plausible value
for LR0B(E,H,¬H). An implicit message is that TOF may look at this collection in statistical
terms.
When processing a multi-LR message TOF will transform its belief according to each of
the values thereby obtaining a collection of probability functions rather than a single one. If
TOF is already maintaining a collection of belief functions then each of these is transformed in
correspondence with each of the LR values in the message, and a possibly larger collection of
probability distributions results. Working with collections of belief functions rather than with
a single belief function comes under several names. As an approach it introduces ignorance
on top of uncertainty.
7.2 Imprecise beliefs for TOF
Remarkably the central tenets of belief revision theory as incorporated in AGM style belief
revision have not found a noticeable audience in forensics. Probabilistic AGM theory, which
may be of use in forensics has been developed in Voorbraak [43] and in Suzuki [41], and is
ready for use.
Imprecise belief modeled by way of non-singleton representors can be traced back to Keynes
(see Weatherson [45]), and features explicitly in Levi [27] with subsequent work in e.g. Voor-
braak [43], Weatherson [46, 47] and Rens [33].26 Imprecise belief is supposed to enable the
incorporation of ignorance into a framework primarily meant to deal with uncertainty. Bie-
dermann [14] provides a recent exposition and justification of the viewpoint that ignorance is
merely a variation on the theme of uncertainty, at least in the context of forensic reasoning.
Nevertheless, the restriction to precise belief states is increasingly considered to constitute
a source of practical problems by authors in forensic science. For instance in Morisson &
Enzinger [31] and in Sjerps et al. [38] the case is made that a likelihood ratio ought to be
reported by an MOE as a value equipped with resolution and precision.
7.3 Necessity of background knowledge management for TOF
Suppose that 0 < PTOF(H) < 1 and that MOE sends TOF a single message report:
sndMOE→TOF(< LR
0
MOE(E,H,¬H) = r&PMOE(E) = 1 >)
with 0 < r to which TOF, for whom E is outside its proposition space, reacts by transforming
its belief state to P ′
TOF
and in particular its belief in H according to the familiar equation:
P ′TOF(H) =
r · PTOF(H)
1 + (r − 1) · PTOF(H)
26Verbal likelihood ratio scales (see Marquis et al. [30]) seem to constitute an approach based on imprecise
values, but the authors strongly insist that verbal scales must not be understood or used in that manner.
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Then it follows from the above assumptions that 0 < P ′
TOF
(H) < 1. Moreover it is
implied that r − 1 > (r − 1) · PTOF(H), so that r > 1 + (r − 1) · PTOF(H) and therefore
P ′
TOF
(H) > PTOF(H).
Now one may imagine that the same process is repeated, that is TOF receives the same mes-
sage from MOE and once more pursues the same transformation, thus obtaining P ′′
TOF
(H) >
P ′
TOF
(H). It follows that by repeatedly conditioning on the same evidence, w.r.t. the same
likelihood ratio, an increasing sequence of probabilities is found for TOF’s belief in H with 1
as its limit.
This phenomenon must be prevented. There is no other option than that TOF maintains
a historic record of the probabilistic transformations which have led to its current belief state,
and makes sure that each of these transformations are sufficiently independent. At the back-
ground TOF maintains a proposition space which incorporates all propositions that have been
used as parameters for a probabilistic transformation. This is a crucial knowledge management
task, the details of which lie outside the realm probability theory, however.
Perhaps more importantly, one notices that the state of knowledge of TOF cannot exclu-
sively be modeled by means of a single belief state and that temporal information enters the
scene, including historical information about past beliefs.
7.4 Incomplete belief states for TOF
The idea that a belief state (SA, PA) for A is a partial belief state rests upon the notion
that only some of A’s beliefs are represented by propositions in SA. However, a belief state
may be incomplete in another manner if its probability distribution is a partial function.
We will call such belief states incomplete. Thus partiality and incompleteness are logically
independent properties of a belief state. Suppose (SA, P
⋆
A) is an incomplete belief state where
the superscript of P ⋆A indicates that it may be a partial function. Classically an incomplete
belief state corresponds to a belief state with a non-singleton representor:
P ⋆⋆A = {PA : SA → Q0 | P
⋆
A ⊆ PA}
Allowing TOF to maintain an incomplete belief state is a special case of working with imprecise
probabilities. It may be the case, however, that P ⋆⋆A = ∅ in which the incomplete belief state
may be considered inconsistent. Precisely that situation is a point of departure for quantum
logic. The Bell inequalities provide criteria under which an incomplete belief state can or
cannot be extended to a complete belief state. Following the exposition of de Muynck [32] a
connection between such criteria and axioms for probability over a meadow is discussed in [10].
Whether or not there is a useful role in forensic logic for incomplete belief states (SA, P
⋆
A) with
P ⋆⋆A = ∅ remains to be seen.
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